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Introduction
Promoting connectivity to very high capacity networks
is one of the objectives of the new EU Telecom Code.
The review of the Telecom Framework is one of the
pillars of the EU Digital Single Market Strategy. On 21
December 2020, the implementation period of the
Telecom Code will elapse. The Telecom Code broadens
the scope of regulation and introduces new forms of
market regulation in order to pursue the EU connectivity
objectives. What does this mean for the concept of ex
ante regulation1 that has been the cornerstone of
telecommunications regulation for more than two
decades? And what lessons can be learned from this ex
ante regulation framework when looking into the new ex
ante tools the European Commission (the Commission)
is considering in view of the regulation of other markets
within the digital economy?
This article explores the ex ante regulation in the
Telecom Code as well as its changed context. The goals
and scope of the Telecom Code as well as the main tools
for regulation are discussed in the second section. The
third section describes the system of ex ante regulation
as it has been developed under the Telecom Framework
and adjusted in the Telecom Code. The fourth section
explains the conditions for imposing ex ante regulations,
taking into account the connectivity goals of the Telecom
Code. As the context of applying ex ante regulation has
also changed due to new forms of market regulations, the
fifth section explores what this will mean for the
application of ex ante regulation. In the sixth section the
proposals for ex ante regulation as a means to regulate
other markets of the Digital Economy are evaluated from
the perspective of the experience with ex ante regulation
in the electronic communications sector.
The Telecom Code
On 20December 2018, a new TelecomCode entered into
force.2 The TelecomCode consists in one comprehensive
Harmonisation Directive replacing four of the five
Directives3 that formed the main body of
telecommunications regulation in the EU since 2002.4 In
2009, further to a periodic review, all five Directives were
amended by the Better Regulation Directive5 and the
Citizens’ Rights Directive,6 addressing specific topics
such as access and consumer rights but not changing the
fundamentals of the Directives. In general, the
telecommunications framework based on these Directives
(Telecom Framework) focuses on regulating three
domains: facilitating access to the market, promoting
competition on the markets, as well as safeguarding
end-user interests and societal needs.7 The first domain
relates to the facilitation of access to the market through
a light authorisation process, whichmeans that an operator
* Prof. Dr. G.P. (Gera) van Duijvenvoorde is part-time professor with special appointment in Telecommunications Law at Leiden University, eLaw-Center for Law and
Digital Technologies. She is also attorney-at-law at KPN in the Netherlands. This publication is based on independent research and reflects the objective findings and
personal opinions of the author.
1The term “ex ante” literally means “before the event” and refers to market intervention by a regulatory body including remedies imposed on one or more providers, such
as pricing regulation or obligations to offer wholesale broadband products.
2Directive 2018/1972 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) [2018] OJ L321/36 (the Telecom Code).
3Directive 2002/19 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities [2002] OJ L108/7 (Access Directive); Directive
2002/20 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ L108/21 (Authorisation Directive); Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) [2002] OJ L108/33; Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users’ rights relating
to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) [2002] OJ L108/51. Directive 2002/58 concerning the processing of personal data and
the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) [2002] OJ L201/37 as amended by Directive 2006/24
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications
networks [2006] OJ L105/54 is not replaced by the Telecom Code.
4On the developments of the EU Telecoms Framework, see M. Cave, C. Genakos and T. Valletti, “The European Framework for Regulating Telecommunications: A 25-year
Appraisal” (2019) 55 Rev. Ind. Organ. 47.
5Directive 2009/140 amending Directives 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19 on access to, and
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20 on the authorisation of electronic networks and services (Better Regulation
Directive) [2009] OJ L337/37.
6Directive 2009/136 amending Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation 2006/2004 on co-operation between national
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws [2009] OJ L337/11 (Citizens’ Rights Directive).
7With reference to the Telecom Framework and the draft Telecom Code, see the handbook by Andrej Savin, EU Telecommunications Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
European Law Series, 2018).
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must only send a notification to the national regulatory
authority (NRA) when accessing national electronic
communications markets. Only in the case of scarce
resources, such as radio spectrum, are Member States
allowed to apply licensing procedures for allocating the
rights of use.8 The second domain concerns market
regulation aimed at safeguarding and promoting
competition on electronic communications markets. To
this end, the framework consists not only of access and
interconnection obligations but also of ex ante market
regulations on the basis of which obligations can be
imposed on providers with significant market power.9
The third domain regards end-user interests and societal
needs, such as universal service, and consists in a
comprehensive set of detailed end-users regulations10 as
well as data protection rules.11 Specific end-user protection
as regards roaming and net neutrality can be found in
separate regulations.12 Next to the three domains, the
Directives regulate institutional topics, such as the criteria
for NRAs as regards their powers and independence, their
supervision costs and processes for consultation and
dispute resolution.13 A separate regulation on the Body
of European Regulators for Electronic Communications
(BEREC) has existed since its establishment in 2009.14
The Telecom Code not only integrated the Directives
but also extended the scope and goals of regulation, and
added new provisions as tools for pursuing the objectives.
As a result of this the Telecom Code is a mixture of old
and new provisions, but all of them need to be interpreted
in the light of the scope and objectives.15
Although the wording “telecommunications” had
always been—and still is—the common terminology to
identify the scope of regulation,16 the field of law under
the Telecoms Framework is to a large extent determined
by the definitions of “electronic communications
networks” and “electronic communications services”.17
The key elements in the definitions are the transmission
of signals through a variety of infrastructures, such as
cable, radio waves, satellites, all with the aim to create a
technologically neutral framework.18 The definitions
include the transmission through radio and television as
well as cable television networks.19 Excluded from
regulation is the content transmitted by signals, such as
the content of internet sites and television programmes,
as well as the Information Society services.20Over-the-top
services, as offered by Skype and Google, could be
qualified as electronic communications services, but only
recently in 2019 the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
clarified the scope by applying the criterion that services
need to be delivered against a remuneration and that a
contractual relationship must exist. The result is that a
Skype service, being a voice-over-internet protocol (VoIP)
with possibilities to call fixed or mobile numbers, can be
qualified as an electronic communications services due
to the remuneration and the contract with telecom
providers to connect to the public switched telephone
network (PSTN).21 The provision of a web-based service
which does not provide internet access in itself, such as
the Gmail service provided by Google, does not consist
wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals through
electronic communications networks and therefore does
not qualify as electronic communications service.22
The Telecom Code extended the scope of regulation.
The definition of “electronic communications service” is
adapted so that it does not only comprise electronic
communications services but also includes internet access
services and interpersonal communications services. The
extension to internet access services aligns the Telecom
Code with the Netneutrality Regulation as it copies the
definition of internet access services in this Regulation.23
The extension to interpersonal communications services
broadens the scope to services normally provided for
8 Framework Directive arts 9–11 in conjunction with the Authorisation Directive.
9 Framework Directive arts 14–16 in conjunction with arts 8–13b of the Access Directive.
10 Framework Directive art.8(4) in conjunction with the Universal Service Directive.
11Directive on privacy and electronic communications.
12Regulation 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (Roaming Regulation) [2012] OJ L172/10; Regulation 2015/2120 laying
down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and
services and Regulation 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (Netneutrality Regulation) [2015 OJ L310/1.
13See, for example, Framework Directive arts 3–8 (independency and powers of NRA); arts 20–21 (dispute resolution); Authorisation Directive arts 12–13 (administrative
costs).
14Regulation 1211/2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office (BEREC Regulation) [2009] OJ L337/1.
15 In addition to the TelecomCode, a new BERECRegulation has been adopted, clarifying the role of BEREC also as to the TelecomCode, Regulation 2018/1971 establishing
the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office), amending Regulation 2015/2120
and repealing Regulation 1211/2009 [2018] OJ L321/1.
16 For this reason, the wording “telecommunications” is used in the publication to identify the field of law.
17 Framework Directive art.2(a), (c) and (d). In addition to these networks and services, the Framework Directive regulates conditional access systems, advanced digital
equipment and application program interfaces, as defined under art.2(f), (o) and (p).
18 Framework Directive Recital 18, stressing that regulation neither imposes nor discriminates in favour of the use of a particular type technology while not precluding the
taking of proportionate steps to promote certain specific services where this is justified (for example, digital television as a means for increasing spectrum efficiency).
19 Framework Directive art.2(c), as confirmed by UPC Nederland BV v Gemeente Hilversum (C-518/12) EU:C:2013:709 at [47]: “Article 2(c) of the Framework Directive
must be interpreted as meaning that a service consisting in the supply of a basic cable package, the charge for which includes transmission costs as well as payments to
broadcasters and royalties paid to copyright collecting societies in connection with the transmission of programme content, falls within the definition of an ‘electronic
communications service’ and, consequently, within the substantive scope both of that directive and of the specific directives constituting the NRF applicable to electronic
communications services, in so far as that service entails primarily the transmission of television content on the cable distribution network to the receiving terminal of the
final consumer”. In UPC DTH Sàrl v Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság Elnökhelyettese (C-475/12) EU:C:2014:285 at [58], the court argued that also the provision of
conditional access systems can qualify as the provision of electronic communications services.
20Framework Directive art.2(c): Information Society services are excluded from the scope. An Information Society service is any service normally provided for remuneration,
at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services: Directive 2015/1535 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in
the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services [2015] OJ L241/1 art.1(1(b).
21 Skype Communications Sàrl v Institut belge des services postaux et des télécommunications (IBPT) (C-142/18) EU:C:2019:460 at [49].
22Google LLC v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-193/18) EU:C:2019:498 at [41].
23 See Netneutrality Regulation art.2(2).
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remuneration that enable direct interpersonal and
interactive exchange of information via electronic
communications networks between a finite number of
persons.24 This brings all types of emails, messaging
services, or group chats under the scope.25 The Telecom
Code distinguishes number-based and
number-independent interpersonal communications
services.26 The services Gmail or Skype are likely to fall
both within the scope of interpersonal communications
services but may be qualified different as Gmail is likely
to be number-independent whereas Skype might be a
number-dependent service (e.g. in the case of Skype-out).
The difference is relevant as only a limited set of
provisions in the Telecom Code are applicable to
number-independent services.27
The Telecom Code restated the goals of regulation to
be observed by NRAs when applying the regulation. The
Telecom Framework is aimed at promoting competition,
contributing to the internal market and promoting the
interests of end-users.28 In pursuing these goals, NRAs
need to follow objective, transparent, non-discriminatory
and proportional principles for regulation, such as
predictable regulation, the promotion of efficient
investments and innovation in new and better
infrastructures.29 The Telecom Code upholds the three
goals of the Telecom Framework, although they have
been reformulated.30 However, a new goal to promote
connectivity and access to, and take-up of, very high
capacity networks, including fixed, mobile and wireless
networks is added.31Avery high capacity network consists
wholly of optical fibre elements or is capable of delivering
a similar network performance.32 The goal fits in with the
EU Action Plan on the Gigabit Society.33 The goal on
connectivity is also linked with the other goals as it is
vital to promote sustainable investment in the
development of these new networks, while safeguarding
competition, and boosting consumer choice through
regulatory predictability and consistency.34 This means
that NRAs, in pursuing the goals, even if they had already
been part of the Telecom Framework, need to be aware
of a new dimension of the goals. In the first place this
applies to the regulatory principles, such as the principle
to promote efficient investments and innovation in new
and enhanced infrastructures when imposing access
obligations and by permitting co-investment arrangements
between investors and parties seeking access to diversify
the risk of investment.35 In the second place, the new
dimension needs to be taken into account when applying
the provisions in the Telecom Code. This is obvious for
the application of new provisions, such as the obligation
to conduct geographical surveys of the coverage and
roll-out of broadband networks.36 This is less obvious for
the provisions that did not seem to have changed much
but need to be applied in view of the new goals and scope
of the Telecom Code. It is a challenging task both for
Member States to implement the Telecom Code in a
coherent way and for NRAs to find a way to best pursue
the goals and apply the regulating principles.
Ex ante regulation is one of the regulations developed
under the Telecom Framework that had been adapted in
the Telecom Code as a means to promote competition.
In the Telecom Code, ex ante regulation needs to be
applied in view of the new goals, such as promoting
efficient investments and innovation in new and enhanced
infrastructures as well as co-investments while adhering
to the principle to impose ex ante obligations only to the
extent to secure effective and sustainable competition in
the interest of end-users.37The Commission also considers
the tool of ex ante regulation as a new tool for regulating
the digital economy, outside the scope of the Telecom
Code. Therefore, the next sections focus on ex ante
regulation.
Ex ante regulation framework
Ex ante regulation is a type of sector-specific market
regulation aimed at assessing the competition in markets
and imposing obligations on providers if necessary to
prevent a distortion of the market. The analyses are
performed from a forward-looking perspective over a
given time horizon. NRAs need to follow a strict
procedure in their market assessments and are obliged to
notify the draft outcome of the assessment to the
Commission before adopting the obligations. An
impressive overview of all market consultations to date
can be found on the Commission’s website.38
24Telecom Code art.2(5).
25Telecom Code Recital 17. Linear broadcasting, video on demand, websites, social networks, blogs, or exchange of information between machines are not considered to
be interpersonal communications services. A communication channel in online games will fall outside the scope if this communication facility is minor and purely ancillary
to another service. Other communications such as WhatsApp, Google Hangouts or iMessage are likely to fall within the scope.
26Telecom Code art.2(6) and (7). “Number-based” means that the interpersonal communications services connect with publicly assigned numbering resources, namely a
number or numbers in national or international numbering plans, or which enables communication with a number or numbers in national or international numbering plans.
27 For example, the title on end-users rights (Pt III Title III arts 98–116) requires close reading as not all end-user rights apply to number-independent interpersonal
communications services.
28 Framework Directive art.8(2)–(4). These articles indicate how NRAs can contribute to the goal.
29 Framework Directive art.8(5).
30Telecom Code art.3(2): competition (b), contribution of internal market (c) and promotion of interests of citizens (d).
31Telecom Code art.3(2)(a).
32As defined in Telecom Code art.2(2).
33Communication on Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market—Towards a European Gigabit Society COM(2016) 587 final.




37Telecom Code art.3(4)(d) and (f).
38 See “Welcome to CIRCABC” available at: https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp [Accessed 7 August 2020]. They are also referred
to as “Art. 7 Notices” owing to their legal basis in art.7, 7a and 7b of the Framework Directive.
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As ex ante regulation is aimed at promoting
competition, this goal may concur with the goals of EU
competition law, as can be found in arts 101 and 102
Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). For this
reason, the Telecom Framework requires NRAs to
conduct the three-criteria test to determine whether NRAs
are allowed to apply ex ante regulation on a specific
market. The three-criteria test consists of three cumulative
criteria to be assessed. The first criterion is the presence
of high and non-transitory access barriers. The second
criterion addresses whether a market structure tends
towards effective competition within a relevant time
horizon. The third criterion is that the application of
competition law alone would not adequately address the
market failure(s) concerned.39 Failure to meet any one of
the three criteria would indicate that a market should not
be identified as susceptible to ex ante regulation.40 The
Telecom Code codifies the three-criteria test.41
After having applied the three-criteria test NRAs need
to proceed with a strict step-by-step analysis: the first
step being the assessment of the relevant markets; the
second step consisting in the assessment of competition
on the markets and the designation of providers with
significant market power (SMP); and the third step
leading to the imposition of obligations on the providers
with SMP if appropriate and in accordance with the
principle of proportionality. The Commission provides
tools42 for NRAs to carry out the extensive market
analyses every three years under the Telecom Framework
and every five years under the Telecom Code.43
The first step consists of an assessment of the relevant
market in accordance with the principles of EU
competition law.44 This means that the relevant product
market must be defined by assessing the substitution of
all products and services, in terms of their objective
characteristics, their prices or their intended use, so
grouping together all products and services that are used
by consumers for the same purpose.45 For example, retail
product markets for internet access are defined according
to the substitution of different forms of internet access
for end-users, such as internet access through different
types of networks (fibre, coax, copper or mobile).46
However, the providers of retail services often depend
on services provided by other providers in upstream
markets, such as wholesale broadband access or wholesale
access to networks.47 This means that, for analysing
markets in the telecommunications sector, multiple retail
and wholesale markets need to be defined and assessed
in order to determine whether they are effectively
competitive.48 The geographical market comprises an area
in which the competition conditions are sufficiently
homogeneous. Often, it consists in an area covered by a
network or by regulatory measures.49
The second step consists in assessing the competition
on the markets and whether the competition is distorted
by providers with SMP. An undertaking is deemed to
have SMP if, either individually or jointly with others, it
enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say,
a position of economic strength affording it the power to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of
competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.50 The
criterion matches the definition of a dominant position
under art.102 TFEU. Very large market shares held by
an undertaking for some time may be an indicator for a
dominant position. High market shares alone might not
be sufficient, for instance, if the undertaking is gradually
losing market shares.51Other factors need to be taken into
account, such as access barriers and technical and
commercial advantages or superiority. Vertical integration
meaning that a provider operates on retail markets as well
as on wholesale markets, is also a factor to be taken into
account.52 Although both the definition of the relevant
markets and the assessment of SMP are based on
principles developed under competition law, the outcome
under ex ante regulation and competition law may differ
as the concepts are closely linked to the objectives under
the relevant policies. The designation of a provider as
having SMP in a market defined for the purpose of ex
ante regulation does not automatically imply that this
provider is also dominant pursuant to art.102 TFEU.53
When the NRA has designated a provider with SMP,
the NRA is obliged to impose obligations on the SMP
provider as a third step. The obligations must be
proportional: the NRA needs to choose the least intrusive
39Recommendation 2014/710 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with
Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2014] OJ L295/79 (Recommendation Relevant Markets) at
[10]–[17].
40Recommendation Relevant Markets, Recital 17.
41Telecom Code art.67(1). The three-criteria test is assumed to be met in the case of markets included in the Recommendation Relevant Markets, unless the NRA determines
that one or more of the criteria are not met due to specific national circumstances.
42For example, Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services C(2018) 2374 final (SMP Guidelines).
43 Framework Directive art.16(6a); Telecom Code art.67(5).
44Recommendation Relevant Markets, Recital 4; SMP Guidelines (2018), para.9.
45 SMP Guidelines (2018), para.33.
46 SMP Guidelines (2018), para.40 mentions that at retail level technological developments have generally led to inter-platform competition.
47 SMP Guidelines (2018), para.40. A SSNIP test, an econometric method, is used to determine whether different wholesale platforms such as copper, fibre and cable are
included in a single wholesale market.
48The Recommendation Relevant Markets provides recommendations for the definition of four wholesale markets: see Annex to the Recommendation.
49SMPGuidelines (2018), paras 48–51. Both indicators often lead to national geographic electronic communications markets, although geographical markets can be defined
as international (e.g. international roaming services) or local (e.g. in areas with local Fibre-to-the-Home networks) markets.
50 Framework Directive art.14(2); Telecom Code art.63(2).
51 SMP Guidelines (2018), para.56.
52 SMP Guidelines (2018), paras 57–58.
53 SMP Guidelines (2018), para.11.
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way of addressing the problems identified in the market
analysis.54 The obligations are only imposed on the SMP
provider(s); so it leads to asymmetric regulation. The
NRA toolbox exists of obligations described in the
Telecom Framework.55 For example, the NRA may
impose obligations on the SMP provider to provide
physical access to networks or virtual access to wholesale
or retail services. Ancillary obligations with regard to
non-discrimination, transparency and costs may be
imposed as well. Obligations at wholesale level are
imposed where otherwise one or more retail markets
would not likely become effectively competitive. The
remedies may be imposed on the relevant market on
which the SMP position exists but also on closely related
markets. The third step does not rely on a competition
law framework and is specifically developed in the
context of ex ante regulation. The obligations are related
to the different types of competition problem(s) identified
on the underlying retail market(s) and are aimed at
remedying market failures while at the same time
fulfilling the specific objectives of the Telecom
Framework. Given this specific scope, it is possible that
parallel procedures under ex ante regulation and ex post
EU competition law apply.56
The Telecom Code pursues the system of ex ante
regulation to a large extent. It incorporated the
three-criteria test57 as well as the three steps of the
identifying markets58 and providers with SMP59 as well
as imposing obligations on SMP providers.60 The regular
cycle of conducting market analyses has changed from
three to five years.61 The forward-looking assessment of
the markets needs to be done in the absence of existing
ex ante regulation and comprises an analysis of market
developments, of all relevant competitive restraints at
wholesale and retail level as well as other types of
regulation.62 The consultation process and notification to
the Commission were kept within the Telecom Code
although scattered.63 In sum, this means that draft market
analysis decisions, with assessment of relevant markets,
SMP and proposed obligations, need to be notified to the
Commission.64BEREC andNRAs of otherMember States
get the opportunity to provide their comments in the
consultation period. The Commission has the power to
veto the draft market analysis decisions but only as
regards the definition of markets or the assessment of the
significant market power. This means that, after a negative
decision by the Commission on these assessments, the
NRA will not have the power to adopt the market
decision. The power to veto the draft market decision
cannot be exercised as regards the obligations proposed.
This means that the NRA has more freedom in deciding
which tool is necessary and proportional in order to
remedy the market distortion.65
Although the main criteria for assessment of ex ante
regulation as well as the consultation process did not
change in the Telecom Code, new tools have been added
in order to provide NRAs with more room to meet the
objectives of the Telecom Code.66 The Telecom Code
extended the regulatory toolbox for NRAs.67 New
regulatory tools have been included as regards
co-investment, access to civil works, and for
wholesale-only providers. As with all obligations, these
obligations can only be imposed if proportionate, justified
in the light of the objectives and after the consultation
process has been followed.68
The expansion of the toolbox to serve the
new goals
An important goal of the Telecom Code is to find a
balance between regulation, connectivity and investments.
Market regulation should promote efficient investment
and innovation in new enhanced infrastructures.69 It must
take into account the variety of conditions relating to
infrastructure, competition, and the circumstances of
end-users, and consumers in the various geographical
areas.70 Ex ante regulations may only be imposed as far
as necessary to secure effective and sustainable
competition in the interest of end-users, and relax or lift
such obligations as soon as that condition is fulfilled.71
These goals should be observed when designing and
applying the remedies to be imposed on providers with
SMP. NRAs need to consider the impact of new market
developments, such as in relation to commercial
agreements, including co-investment agreements, and
54Access Directive art.8(4); Telecom Code art.68(2).
55 Framework Directive art.14(3), with reference to arts 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the Access Directive and art.17 of the Universal Service Directive.
56SMPGuidelines (2018), para.12. See for a parallel application of ex ante regulation and art.102 TFEU, Telefonica SA v European Commission (C-295/12 P) EU:C:2014:2062;
[2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 18; Slovak Telekom as v European Commission (T-851/14) EU:T:2018:929; [2014] 4 C.M.L.R. 21.
57Telecom Code art.67(1).
58Telecom Code art.64. However, the markets for fixed voice and mobile voice termination are regulated without ex ante market regulation contrary to its regulation under
the Framework Directive. See Telecom Code art.75 on termination rates.
59Telecom Code art.63.
60Telecom Code art.68 in conjunction with arts 69–74, 76 and 80.
61Telecom Code art.67(5). A three-year period applies after a revised Recommendation on relevant markets and for markets not previously notified to the Commission. On
exceptional basis the five-year period may be extended by up to one year.
62Telecom Code art.67(2).
63Telecom Code arts 23 (national consultation) and 32 (consultation with Commission, BEREC and NRAs of other Member States).
64Telecom Code art.32.
65Telecom Code arts 32(4) (serious doubts), 32(5) (veto) and art.33 on the procedure for consistent application of remedies.
66Telecom Code art.32(1) in conjunction with art.3.
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influencing competitive dynamics.72The toolbox of NRAs
consists of existing tools in the Framework,73, although
sometimes adjusted to reflect the new goals,74 and new
tools.
The first new tool relates to access to civil
engineering.75 It is a tool of imposing obligations to meet
reasonable requests for access to, and use of, a wide range
of civil engineering, such as buildings, building cables,
wiring, antennae, towers, supporting constructions,
manholes and cabinets. Access to these civil engineering
assets is crucial for the successful roll-out of new
networks because of the high costs of duplication, and
the significant savings that can be made when they can
be re-used. Therefore, this access remedy can be imposed
as a standalone remedy to be considered before assessing
the need to impose any other potential remedies.76
The second new tool relates to the possibility to enter
into commitments as a result of which the obligations are
not imposed or only in an adapted way. The first type of
commitment regards the regulatory treatment of new very
high capacity network elements consisting of optical fibre
elements up to the end-user premises or base station, upon
receipt of commitments by the SMP providers.77 The
commitments may consist of offering co-ownership or
long-term risk sharing through co-financing or through
purchase agreements, giving rise to specific rights of a
structural character by other providers of electronic
communications services. Co-investment gives SMP
providers the opportunity to invest in, for example, a fibre
network while being supported by investments of
providers using the fibre network.78 This can be done
through a joint venture but also by reciprocal or one-way
access models.79 The arrangements might stimulate
investments and accelerate the pace of the development
of advanced communications networks being beneficial
to the development of the digital economy.80 The SMP
provider may influence the obligations imposed by
arranging its agreements with the third party co-investing
in the network in such a way that it meets the
requirements as listed in the Telecom Code.81 One of the
requirements is that the arrangement cannot be exclusive
for the co-investors and needs to be open to third parties
entering the co-investment arrangements at a later stage.
Another requirement is that the co-investment is beneficial
for end-users. If the requirements are met, and after a
market test, the NRA can declare the co-investment
arrangement binding for a period of seven years and
refrain from imposing obligations as regards the elements
of the new very high capacity network during this period.
However, the NRA holds the power to impose obligations
further to a market analysis in order to address significant
competition problems on specific markets that would
otherwise not be addressed.82
Generally, there is more room for offering
commitments for access, co-investments or both by SMP
providers to the NRA. In addition to the commitment
procedure for new very high capacity networks as
discussed above, SMP providers may propose
co-operative agreements relevant for the assessment of
the appropriate and proportionate obligations. Operators
that voluntarily separated their vertically integrated
companies may provide effective and non-discriminatory
access to third parties. If these commitments are fair,
reasonable, open, non-discriminatory and meet other
requirements, the NRA makes them binding. As a result
of this, the commitments will be taken into account when
drafting the remedies and may lead to a decision to
withdraw obligations.83
The third new tool involves companies that are not
active on retail markets—for example, companies
operating a fibre network and offering access to internet
service providers without providing broadband access
services to end-users. Hence, the operator of the fibre
network is not engaged in any competition with the
internet service providers on its network. In the case of
a wholesale-only company, the NRA may decide to only
impose non-discrimination and access obligations, against
fair and reasonable pricing on these wholesale-only
companies.84
The fourth new tool is related to the migration from
legacy infrastructure.85 Promoting investments is not only
related to supporting the development of new
infrastructures but also to provide room for dismantling
legacy networks, such as the copper networks, and to
migrate services to comparable services on the new
infrastructure. SMP provisions as regards the legacy
72Telecom Code art.68(6).
73Telecom Code arts 69 (transparency), 70 (non-discrimination), 71 (obligation of accounting separation), 73 (access), 74 (price control and cost-accounting obligations),
77 (functional separation) and 78 (voluntary separation by a vertical integrated undertaking).
74 For example, Telecom Code art.73(2), which added (e) and (f) compared to art.12 of the Access Directive in order to reflect investments in very high capacity networks
and the risks ((e)) as well as economically infrastructure-based competition and innovative business models that support sustainable competition, such as those based on
co-investment in networks ((f)).
75Telecom Code art.72.
76Telecom Code Recital 187.
77Telecom Code art.76 and Recital 199. In exceptional circumstances, for example, when it is technically impracticable to deploy optical fibre elements to the premises,
this may also apply to optical fibre elements that are deployed just outside and in the immediate proximity of the end-user’s premises.
78 See, in the context of the draft Telecom Code, Serge J.H. Gijrath, “Negotiating and Performing Infrastructure Sharing Agreements under the European Electronic
Communications Code” (2018) 24 C.T.L.R. 90.
79 See Draft BEREC Guidelines to foster the consistent application of the criteria for consistent application of the criteria for assessing co-investments in new very high
capacity network elements (art.76 EECC), BoR(20) 113 (12 June 2020), based on art.76(4), explaining, among other things, the model covered by the clause (see para.3.1.5).
80W. Briglauer et al, “Public Policy Targets in EU Broadband Markets” (2017) 41 Telecommunications Policy 949, assessing the draft co-invest tool as encouraging
investments, although dependent on the conditions.
81Telecom Code art.76 in conjunction with 79 and Annex IV of the Code with the criteria for assessing co-investment offers.
82Telecom Code art.76(2).
83Telecom Code art.68(6).
84Telecom Code art.80. However, if competition problems arise on the downstream markets to the detriment of end-users, other obligations may be imposed on the basis
of art.80(4).
85Telecom Code art.81.
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networks can be lifted under certain conditions. A
prerequisite is the availability of suitable conditions for
migration, which means that alternative access products
must be made available for service providers in order to
serve their end-users with adequate planning and
conditions for migration.86 Transparency is required if the
access to or use of the services and applications will
change as a result of the migration.87 Also, the migration
should be notified in time.88
The new toolbox provides for more flexibility for SMP
providers to influence the remedies. Some of the new
obligations, such as the wholesale only and the
co-investment remedies, can be influenced by the
providers themselves. This means that the way the
providers organise their company or their investments
may influence the remedy to be imposed by the NRA.
Dependent on how they structure their arrangements with
third parties, they may benefit from discontinuing
obligations as these may be replaced by commitments in
full or in part. Also, the organisation of the company of
the provider can influence the set of obligations,
especially when the provider is only engaged in wholesale
services. The new toolbox needs to be implemented by
Member States so that the NRAs have a legal basis for
applying them to SMP providers while serving the goals.
In addition to the new tools, current tools have also
been adjusted in order to provide for a more flexible
framework to support investments, like the assessment
of price control systems that need to promote competition
and long-term end-user interests related to the deployment
and take-up of next-generation networks.89 NRAs need
to carry out a complex market assessment as they need
to assess the new tools, not only stand-alone but also in
relation to the SMP framework in place and the existing
tools. They need to assess whether the combination of
tools results in an optimum balance of promoting
investments and competition. A delicate process, that will
be evaluated by the Commission and supported by
BEREC guidelines90 in order to assist the NRAs.
New market regulation promoting the
roll-out of networks
The new toolbox in ex ante regulation is not the only
amendment in market regulation enacted in order to
facilitate and stimulate connectivity, competition and
investments in very high capacity networks. The Telecom
Code introduces new market regulations beyond the ex
ante framework in order to pursue the connectivity goals.91
Two of these new regulations may be closely related to
ex ante regulation.
In the first place, the Telecom Code provides a tool for
NRAs or other competent authorities to monitor the
roll-out of fibre networks. To that end, telecom providers
will be obliged to provide detailed information about the
current coverage of their broadband networks as well as
their forecasts for rolling out new networks.92On the basis
of the information, the NRAs or competent authorities
will be able to find the geographical areas in which no
roll-out of fibre networks is planned at that time, as a
result of which end-users will not benefit from the gigabit
society. They may invite providers and public authorities
to declare their roll-out intention in those areas that are
likely to be excluded from roll-out. The NRA must take
the results of the surveys into account when identifying
and defining relevant markets for ex ante regulation.93
When the NRA decides that this input results in a
deviating market definition, for example, by defining
narrow, local, geographical markets, the NRA needs to
follow the regular procedure and consult the deviating
market definition with the Commission. After concluding
that the relevant market is not competitive and SMP
exists, remedies may be imposed. However, even when
taking into account the new toolbox, no remedies exist
to enforce the roll-out of new fibre networks.94The powers
of NRAs on the basis of ex ante regulation are limited in
this respect. It is more likely that governments will use
the results in order to decide whether they are willing to
support the roll-out in these specific areas and that they
will use this data to substantiate that any public financing




89Telecom Code art.74(1). Under the Telecom Framework, Recommendation 2013/466 on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote
competition and enhance the broadband investment environment [2013] OJ L251/13 provided for a soft law regulatory pricing approach, promoting investments in Next
Generation Networks; see M. Bilal Ünver, “Is a fine-tuning approach sufficient for EU NGA policy? A global review around the long-lasting debate” (2015) 39
Telecommunications Policy 957.
90 See Draft BEREC Guidelines to foster the consistent application of the criteria for consistent application of the criteria for assessing co-investments in new very high
capacity network elements (art.76 EECC) (2020).
91As this article focuses on market regulation, other new provisions in the Telecom Code, such as on radio spectrum, 5G and end-users’ interests, will not be discussed.
92Telecom Code art.22.
93Telecom Code art.64(3).
94Under the Telecom Framework, the ECJ stipulated in TDC A/S v Teleklagenævnet (C-556/12) EU:C:2014:2009 that, only in order to meet reasonable requests for access,
an obligation may be imposed to install a drop cable not exceeding 30m in length connecting the distribution frame of an access network to the network termination point
at the end-user’s premises, as long as that obligation is based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives set out in
art.8(1) of the Framework Directive. If the NRA requires a SMP provider to install drop cables for the purpose of connecting the end-user to a network, it has to take into
account the initial investment made by the operator concerned and the existence of a price control that makes it possible to recover the costs of installation.
95Telecom Code art.22(1)(2), Recital 229 referring to EU State aid rules (arts 106–109 TFEU).
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In the second place, the Telecom Code introduces a
symmetrical access obligation for network elements that
cannot be replicated by other providers.96 If so, an access
obligation to network elements, such as wiring and cables,
inside buildings or up to the first concentration or
distribution point, or outside buildings may be imposed
on providers or owners of the network elements.97 When
such access will not resolve the economic or physical
barriers to replication, access obligations beyond these
points may be imposed, and even an active access
obligation, meaning access to services, if justified on
technical or economic grounds.98As the access obligations
may be imposed on all companies, irrespective of their
having SMP or not, they are called symmetrical access
obligations. The reason for including the symmetrical
access obligations in the Telecom Code is to prevent that
providers will be deprived of access to viable alternatives
for non-replicable assets, although the imposition of these
obligations must be weighed against possible effects as
undermining incentives for investments and competition.99
The NRAs applying the provisions need to follow the
consultation procedure of ex ante regulation, whichmeans
that the Commission and BEREC should be informed
about the draft decisions and about the review of these
decisions.100 They should also pursue the objectives of
the Telecom Code.101 The three-step analysis developed
in order to apply ex ante regulation tools, however, does
not fit in with the process of imposing symmetric
regulation. Markets need to be defined but the market
review is different as it is not intended to assess SMP. If
the outcome of the analyses indicate that replication faces
high and non-transitory physical or economic barriers,
leading to important competition problems or market
failures at retail level to the detriment of end-users, it
could be justified to extend access obligations. It is more
likely that such extended access obligations will be
necessary if the business case for alternative infrastructure
roll-out is riskier, for example, in areas of low population
density.102
Finding the right balance is crucial, as these obligations
may harm local fibre roll-out.103Therefore, wholesale-only
companies are exempted if they provide effective
alternative access on a commercial basis to a very high
capacity network, on fair, non-discriminatory and
reasonable terms and conditions, including price. This is
also the case if the imposition of obligations would
compromise the economic or financial viability of a new
network deployment, in particular by small local projects,
such as communities rolling out municipal networks. Said
new networks are exempted.104 The Telecom Code
provides that the obligations imposed by NRAs should
be consistent.105 But how this can be achieved exactly is
not clear. For example, if the NRA accepts commitments
for co-investment under ex ante regulation and at the
same time imposes access obligations on the basis of
non-replicability, what would be the framework to decide
on how these obligations are beneficial to the roll-out of
new advanced networks, such as new fibre networks?106
The question also arises in how far the non-replicability
access obligations restricts the role of the three-criteria
test in defining when ex ante regulation is justified and
when competition law suffices. As the Telecom Code
only provides limited insight into the correlation of the
different forms of market regulation, Member States are
likely to implement the TelecomCode without providing
guidance to NRAs on how to achieve the policy goals in
a consistent way. This will lead the NRAs to decide on
the application of the ex ante framework taking into
account the new policy goals and also new market
regulation, such as the new non-replicability symmetric
framework. Even when they use the current toolbox, the
context of applying the regulatory tools will have
changed. Also, other competent authorities than the NRAs
may be involved in monitoring the roll-out of new fibre
networks, and have their role in pursuing the connectivity
goals. It might be difficult to apply the market regulation
in a coherent and consistent way, when all are pursuing
the goals of the Telecom Code. Therefore, when looking
at the importance of promoting the competition on the
market for internet access and of stimulating the
connectivity and development of advanced infrastructures,
it is difficult to predict how NRAs will apply the market
regulation under the Telecom Code and what their
emphasis will be when regulating. Will the new SMP
tools become successful as remedies in ex ante regulation,
or will the non-SMP obligations become the predominant
96Telecom Code art.61(3).
97 Such a point may be a point where cables viewed in the downstream direction are disaggregated (distributed) and viewed in the upstream direction are aggregated
(concentrated): see Draft BEREC Guidelines to foster the consistent application of the criteria for consistent application of the criteria for assessing co-investments in new
very high capacity network elements (art.76 EECC) (2020), paras 25–30.
98Telecom Code art.61(3) subpara.2.
99Telecom Code Recital 152. It could also strengthen the position of dominant players.
100Telecom Code art.61(5).
101Telecom Code art.61(6).
102Telecom Code Recital 154.
103Telecom Code Recital 155. Briglauer et al, “Public Policy Targets in EU Broadband Markets” (2017) 41 Telecommunications Policy 949, 960 points out that symmetric
regulation gives rise to a substantial extension of regulation, outside the scope of the relevant market concept, with a lack of clarity as regards the scope and serious concerns
for the creation of sufficient investments initiatives.
104Telecom Code art.61(3) subparas (a) and (b). See Draft BEREC Guidelines on the Criteria for a Consistent Application of Article 61(3) EECC (2020), paras 85–93
(explaining what are new networks, being generally not older than five years) and paras 94–103 (explaining the projects to be considered small).
105Telecom Code Recital 152. Consistency is also required with Directive 2014/61 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications
networks [2014] OJ L155/1.
106The Draft BEREC Guidelines to foster the consistent application of the criteria for consistent application of the criteria for assessing co-investments in new very high
capacity network elements (art.76 EECC) (2020) mainly focus on explaining the criteria and do not provide much guidance as to how to come to a consistent approach,
although they address the inconsistency in terminology. For example, the concept of “new” in “new network” employments differs from the concept of “new” in co-investment
schemes as well as from the concept of “significant new investment in the broadband network” in the Guidelines of the European Commission for the application of state
aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks [2013] OJ C25/1. See Draft BEREC Guidelines to foster the consistent application of the criteria for
consistent application of the criteria for assessing co-investments in new very high capacity network elements (art.76 EECC) (2020), paras 91–92, fnn.16–17.
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way of regulating the market, as a result of which market
regulation will shift away from ex ante regulation? It is
too early to draw a conclusion on this yet.
Ex ante regulation considered as a tool for
regulating digital economy
While ex ante regulation in the Telecom Code is adapted
and newmarket regulation tools are added to the Telecom
Code, the introduction of ex ante regulation is considered
as a tool to regulate digital markets. The proposals are
aimed at regulating large platforms with significant
network effects, and with the possibility to act as
gatekeepers. As harmonisation regulation of platforms is
limited,107 the Commission relies on the application of
competition law in order to address the concentration of
powers and problems as regards the competitiveness of
digital markets. However, it is felt that this is not
sufficient to remedy potential competition problems.108
Therefore the Commission is exploring ex ante regulation
to regulate digital markets, such as online platforms. The
exploration is taken place in two contexts: a
sector-specific ex ante regulating tool and a new
competition tool.
First, the Commission explores a sector specific ex
ante regulation tool in the context of the Digital Services
Act package.109 The tool is aimed at large online platforms
acting as gate-keepers, to be determined by a set of criteria
such as significant network effects, the size of the user
base and/or the ability to leverage data across markets.
Applying the tool will lead to a prohibition of certain
blacklisted practices as well as the adoption of tailor-made
remedies.110 The Commission indicates that, while
recognising the many differences,
“experience from the targeted and tailor-made ex
ante regulation of telecommunications services can
service as an inspiration in this regard, given the
similarities from network control and network
effects”.111
The new competition tool is the second tool the
Commission is exploring, complementary to the first
tool.112 The Commission provides a rough sketch of four
options of designing the new competition tool. The tool
could exist as a dominance-dominated tool or a market
structure-based tool. The dominance-dominated tool is
aimed at addressing concerns arising from unilateral
conduct by dominant companies without any prior finding
of an infringement of art.102 TFEU. Themarket-structure
based tool is aimed at identifying and remedying
structural competition problems that cannot be addressed
(at all or as effectively) under EU competition law. Each
alternative may either consist of a horizontal scope, i.e.
generally applied across all sectors of the economy, or a
limited scope, i.e. only including certain digital or
digitally enabled markets.113
As the Commission refers to the experience in ex ante
regulation in the telecom sector, it is valuable to consider
to what extent these experiences might be relevant for
regulating digital markets. Although the Commission
only describes a broad outline of the tools, four general
remarks can be made when comparing the ex ante
regulation in the telecoms sector with the suggested tools.
In the first place, the ex ante regulation in the telecoms
sector has been embedded in a clear set of goals as regards
connectivity, competition and investments. The policy
goals as regards digital economy are diverse, and yet less
explicit and focused, as consultations are still pending.114
This means that the policy context relevant for applying
ex ante regulation needs to be more developed to provide
the context within which the ex ante regulation can be
applied.
In the second place, the ex ante regulation in the
Telecom Code consists in the fine-tuned framework of a
three-criteria test to define whether ex ante regulation is
justified, and if so, a three-step analysis of defining the
relevant market, assigning SMP and imposing
proportional remedies that support the goals of the
Telecom Code. In the proposals for introducing ex ante
tools in the digital society, both sector-specific based
tools and competition-based tools are proposed without
elucidating what the relationship will be. Applying a
three-criteria test to define in which cases competition
law may suffice, and under which circumstances ex ante
regulation will be justified, could be helpful. However,
more alignment will be needed when the new competition
tool is introduced so that it will be clear under which
circumstances the tool will be justified. Following the
three steps of investigation under the ex ante regulation
in the Telecom Code, the market definition is the starting
point of the assessment. Exactly this first step is seen as
problematic when assessing digital markets, as in the
digital world it is less clear that well-defined markets can
be identified.115Also, the second step of analysing market
power and SMP is seen as problematic in digital markets
as the current framework, by using market shares, is not
107Regulation 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services [2019] OJ L186/57.
108 J. Crémer, Y.-A. de Montjoye and H. Scheitzer, Competition Policy for the digital area: Final report (2019), pp.54–72 available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition
/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf [Accessed 9 August 2020].
109Communication on Shaping Europe’s digital future COM(2020) 67 final Pt B.
110 Inception Impact Assessment, Digital Service Act Package, “Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with significant network effects acting as gate-keepers
in the European Union’s internal market” (2020), para.3 available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12418-Digital-Services-Act
-package-ex-ante-regulatory-instrument-of-very-large-online-platforms-acting-as-gatekeepers [Accessed 9 August 2020].
111 Inception Impact Assessment, Digital Service Act Package, “Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with significant network effects acting as gate-keepers
in the European Union’s internal market” (2020), para.3b.
112 Inception Impact Assessment, “New Competition Tool (NCT)” available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12416-New
-competition-tool [Accessed 9 August 2020].
113 Inception Impact Assessment, “New Competition Tool (NCT)”, under B, Options 1–4.
114Cremer et al, Competition Policy for the digital area (2019), p.40 are of the opinion that there is no need for a new debate on the goals of EU competition law.
115Cremer et al, Competition Policy for the digital area (2019), p.46.
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considered sufficient, given the role of returns to scale,
network externalities and data in the digital economy.116
The third step, imposing obligations necessary and
proportional to remedy the distortion of competition and
pursue the goals of the digital markets, might be difficult
if the policy goals are diffuse and not made explicit. The
new ex ante remedies on, for example, co-investment
provide room for companies to decide on the ways they
would like to operate on the market and influence the
type of ex ante measures to be imposed. As such they
provide companies with incentives to support the goals.
It is not clear whether the companies in the digital sectors
targeted with the new tools would be given comparable
incentives. In view of the abovementioned uncertainties,
it is unclear whether the structure of ex ante regulation
as developed in the Telecom Framework will be capable
of shaping the ex ante regulation framework for digital
markets.
In the third place, we noted that the role of ex ante
regulation in the Telecom Code might also change, due
to the introduction of other types of market regulation in
the Telecom Code, such as the symmetric access
obligations. There is a tendency to provide regulators
with regulatory tools even if SMP does not exist. Or, to
put it differently, there is a wish to be flexible to impose
obligations if there is a situation of certain market power
and a failure of market forces. Ex ante regulation in this
sense seems to fill in a gap where markets cannot be
strictly defined and a dominant position or SMP may not
be substantiated. It is still too early to conclude whether
the proposals for these new tools will be market orientated
in line with the ex ante regulation in the Telecom
Framework or whether they will result in new
harmonisation initiatives providing a legal basis to
regulate without any market assessment. Compared to
the ex ante regulation in the Telecom Code one can
conclude that the same wording refers to a different
context. Not only is there a lack of policy goals to be
taken into account when imposing obligations, but also
the defined structure of assessing markets, SMP and
obligations is missing, as well as the alignment at EU
level after the notification of draft decisions. As the
application seems to deviate from the ex ante framework
in the Telecom Framework, it is the question whether the
envisaged instruments will benefit from the long
experience in the telecommunications sector.
Finally, in fourth place, changing the foundations of
ex ante regulation and opting for a less market-driven
approach of regulation may not only result in a very
flattered way of regulating the digital economy but also
risks opting for regulating tools lacking the flexibility of
being able to adapt to changing market situations. The
ability to adapt to changing market situations has been
one of the merits of ex ante regulation in the
telecommunications sector in the last two decades. The
charm of ex ante regulation is that it addresses
well-definedmarkets with a distortion of competition and
contains a system of continuously evaluating the
competitiveness of markets and alignment of remedies
with both the competitiveness of markets and the goals
of the Telecom Code. Although the concept and role of
ex ante regulation in the telecom sector might be
changing, its merits are being proved andmight be useful
to consider when developing ex ante tools in other areas
of the digital economy.
Conclusion
The Telecom Code aims at offering a new framework for
the regulation of electronic communications networks
and services pursuing the goals of promoting connectivity,
investments, competition and end-user interests. It is an
important pillar of regulating the digital economy. The
Telecom Code broadens both the objectives for, as well
as the scope and tools of regulation. This has its effect
on market regulation, more specifically on applying ex
ante regulation. The ex ante regulation consists in an
elaborated framework for assessing markets, SMP and
imposing obligations. Although this system in essence
has not changed in the Telecom Code new types of
obligations have been designed in order to provide the
NRAs with more tools to pursue the renewed goals of the
Telecom Code when applying ex ante regulations. SMP
providers co-investing in broadband networks or
exploiting fibre networks may benefit frommore flexible
ex ante obligations. However, the Telecom Code also
introduced new styles of symmetric market regulation
providing NRAs with possibilities to impose access
obligations irrespective of SMP.
Member States need to implement the Telecom Code
before 21 December 2020. Even if they follow the
wording and structure of the TelecomCode closely, which
will be likely as a result of the harmonisation goals, NRAs
may be faced with a new framework to apply. Applying
ex ante regulation in the context of the new goals of the
Telecom Code and in a consistent and coherent way with
non-SMP regulations, will be a challenge for NRAs.More
challenges as regards ex ante regulation will arise. In
other markets of the digital economy a need is felt to
design regulatory ex ante tools in order to fill in the gaps
that exist when these markets will be only regulated on
the basis of general competition law. When comparing
these new proposals with the ex ante framework
developed in the telecommunications sector, the first
impression is that they deviate from the essence of ex
ante regulation. At first glance, essential concepts, like
the three-criteria test and the defined steps on assessing
markets as well as the existence of SMP before imposing
obligations, do not seem to fit, due to, among other things,
the difficulties in assessing digital markets and the market
power of online platforms. Even if it were possible to
develop a three-criteria test in order to decide when ex
ante regulation would be justified, the proposals for a
new competition tool will add a new dimension and
116Cremer et al, Competition Policy for the digital area (2019), pp.48–50.
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challenge to align the tools of regulation and apply them
consistently. The new proposals may learn from the way
that ex ante regulation has been applied over the last two
decades and as it is being reformed in the Telecom Code:
consisting of clear steps and processes, serving
well-formulated goals and with the flexibility to regulate
fast-changing markets.
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